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Overview
• Historical background
• Classical cost-effectiveness model and extensions
– 1960s: Uncertainty at time of Award, but contractor trades cost and performance 
after cost uncertainty is resolved
• Policy prescription remains in effect
– 1970s: Contractor cost uncertainty remains at time of cost-performance trade-
offs
• Optimal cost/risk sharing ratio determined
– 1980s: Contractor’s “effort/cost-reducing actions” unobservable by government
• Contractor maximizes economic profit
– 1985:  Optimal competitive contract with cost-sharing
– 1990s: Award Fee proposal
• Government can observe cost-reduction actions and implicit cost to 
contractor at completion of milestones or contract
• Questions addressed
– What is optimal incentive contract for each informational and decision-
making structure, and what are the government’s informational 
requirements
– What are new challenges?
Brief Historical Background
• Wright Brothers Multiple Incentive Contract
– Target Price = $25K; Target Speed = 40mph
– Contract gains/loses $2.5K for every mph over/under target
– Actual speed = 42 mph; Received reward of $5K
• 1962: Incentive Contracting Guide
– “Perhaps no other DoD procurement policy offers greater potential rewards than the 
expanded use of performance incentives in development contracts.”
• 1968: DoD Program Office for Evaluating and Structuring Multiple Incentive 
Contracts (POESMIC) Established
– Review all multiple incentive contracts with a value over $5M.  Evaluated 150 contracts  
within two and half years
• 1969: DoD/NASA Incentive Contract Guide
– Emphasizes communication of government objectives and performance incentives 
guiding contractor toward these objectives
• 1975 – Present: Academic Contributions
– Extensive academic research on effect of asymmetrical information and competition on 
optimal incentive contracts
• 2005:  GAO Report
– Criticized excessive Award and Incentive Fees
– Significant use of SAR Program data
1969: DoD/NASA Incentive Contracting Guide
• Performance Incentives achieve two important 
objectives:
“first, it communicates, the Government’s objectives  to the 
contractor; second, of greater significance, it establishes the 
contractor’s profit in direct relationship to the value of combined 
performance in all areas”
• Guide implemented Air Force Academy research and 
material taught in Harbridge House contracting courses 
in mid-1960s
– Methodology independently developed
• Policy still in effect today, but under review









CD = Cost of Development
CPO= Cost of Procurement and Operations
TC = Total Cost
CF = Constant Fee (CF1 >  CF2 > CF3; Mirror  Image of CPO)
Model 1 (cont.) Structuring Performance Incentive Function, P(q) 
Using Marginal Willingness to Pay,
L
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In 1970s, it was shown that contractor’s share of costs, s, the risk sharing 
parameter, is constant if certain utility functions apply to both the government 
and contractor. The  cost-sharing ratio does not depend on the degree of cost 
uncertainty at time of contract award.
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Aspects of Cost-Effective Model with 
Contractor Facing Known Trade-offs
• Assumes contractor maximizes accounting profit
• At time of contract award, t1, (accounting) cost 
function facing government and contractor is 
uncertain.  
• Resolution of uncertainty applies to contractor, but 
not to government, at t2, time of cost versus trade-off 
decision-making
• Changes in contractor’s cost share, s, target profit, πT, or target Cost, CT, do not affect the performance 
level selected or the final cost outcome
• Cost overruns may be in the interests of government
Model 2: Cost Uncertainty at t2, Time of Contractor’s Trade-
off Decisions
• Both government and contractor must know utility 
functions at t1
• If government and contractor utility functions support 
an optimal constant cost-sharing ratio (exponential, 
quadratic, logarithmic)
– Sharing ratio achieves optimal expected risk 
sharing from vantage point of t2
– Contractor selects the performance level that 
government would select at t2, if government were 
to have same knowledge of expected trade-offs
Model 3:  Contractor Maximizes Economic Profit 
by Accounting for Implicit Cost of Effort
• Economic Profit, π, equals Accounting Profit, πA, less implicit cost of “effort,”
h(e)
– π = πA – h(e)
– Government cannot observe e
• With discrete outcomes, and all around diminishing returns, one obtains the 
following first order condition with respect to πA : 
.
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where i = ith outcome, C , q , i =1,...,n
P = probability ith outcome is achieved with effort level, e
λ= shadow price of constractor's reservation utility
μ=shadow price of contractor's incentive compatibility constraint
Model 4:  Government Can Observe Contractor’s 
“Effort” and Implicit Costs
• Build on Model 1, in which contractor trade-off 
decisions are made at t2 under conditions of certainty
• Government Program Office and DCMA has 
substantial information about contractor’s effort at 
both milestones and completion of contract, and can 
infer implicit cost function, h
• Applicable to CPAF/IF contract with performance 
incentives 
Incentive Structure for Model 4 When Target 
Performance is qT
• Assume linear sharing is optimal
– Both government and contract have exponential, quadratic, 
or logarithmic utility function
• For ease in displaying solution, assume that cost-reducing 
increases in “effort” do not affect relationship between 
performance and cost
• Then, when P, B, and A represent, respectively the 
Performance Incentive Function, Benefits to Government and 
Award Fee, the following CPAF/IF multiple incentive contract 
structure applies:
P(q-qT) = sB(q-qT)
A = (1-s)h 
Information Requirements of Alternative Incentive Contracts
* Optimal sharing ratio can be obtained using utility functions for 
government and contractor, thereby, achieving optimal risk sharing.  
However, this is not required to achieve optimal performance or 
contract cost
Information Model 1 (1960s) Model 2 (1970s) Model 3 (1980s) Model 4 (1990s)
Required Relative Govt. Benefits Cost-Uncertainty at t2 Unobservable Effort Observable Effort
Govt. Benefit X X X X
Function
Utility Functions of X X
Govt. and Cont.
Cost Function and X
Uncertainty at t2
Probabilityof Ci and qi X
Outcome wrt Effort
Ex Post Accounting X X X X
Cost, CA; and q
Linear Sharing, Cont. * Exponential, Quadratic *
Share of Costs = s Logarithmic Utility
Disutility of Effort X
Function, h(e) (at Milestones)
William Rogerson on Information Requirements of Complex 
Incentive Contracts (e.g., Unobservable Effort)
The nature of the optimal contract varies tremendously 
depending on the precise functional forms of the utility functions 
and the distribution function …[summarizing the asymmetric 
cost uncertainty].  For normative purposes the problem this 
creates is that the precise nature of the optimal contract is highly 
dependent on features of the contracting environment that 
government may be unsure about.  For positive purposes, the 
problem is that the theory does not generate testable predictions 
…. [T]he major value …has been to help clarify the underlying 
incentive issues rather than to explain specific contracting 
phenomenon.
Implications of Analysis
• Models 1 and 4 require substantially less information
- Model 1
- Requires knowing only relative dollar value of  government  
benefits from additional performance and final contract 
accounting cost
- Model 4
- Also requires plausible assumption that government can 
observe effort and its disutility at completion of contract, or at 
relevant milestones
- Can reduce distortions resulting from objective performance 
measures failing to fully reflect government’s valuation of 
contract “performance”
F/A-18E/F CPAF/IF Multiple Incentive Contract 
During Engineering Development
• Includes cost and performance incentives and award fee 
provision
– Contractor shares a portion of development cost
– Fee based on both objectively and subjectively determined 
performance
• Fifty percent based on technical performance, of which 70 
percent based on measurable performance and 30 percent 
based on subjective government assessment of technical 
performance
• Remaining 50 percent based on subjective government 
assessment of contractor management and logistics
• Schedule incentive in which certain funds are withheld until first 
flight is achieved included
Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy Memo, 24 April 2007
New and Continuing Challenges
• Dealing with contract changes remains a challenge
• Specification Policy and Performance Incentives
– Detail design specifications
• Limited room for trading-off cost for performance
– Performance specifications
• Specification of Threshold and Objective Performance enhances 
trade-off possibilities
– Navy’s recently implemented System Design Specifications
• Specifications lie between Detail Design and Performance
• Hierarchical structure with uncertain role of Threshold and Objective 
Performance at top of hierarchy
• Lower-level supporting specifications may be amenable to Award 
Fees
• Recent Pentagon memoranda indicate policy swing from subjective to 
objective performance incentives
– Research required to understand relationship between use of 
performance incentives and new System Design Specification policy  
during engineering development
